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Abstract
This study investigates (i) how unfunded public pensions financed by VAT, as discussed
in Japan, aﬀect economic growth, and (ii) whether payroll tax or VAT is the more growth-
friendly tax structure for the finance of public pensions. We examine these issues in over-
lapping generations (OLG) models with parental altruism and find the following results. A
public pension system financed by VAT itself may increase economic growth when bequests
are operative. By contrast, when bequests are inoperative, public pensions hinder growth un-
less agents are suﬃciently patient. Finally, public pensions financed by VAT have turned out
to be more growth-friendly than those financed by payroll tax when bequests are operative.
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1 Introduction
Population aging driven by increasing longevity and low fertility rates has been making it diﬃ-
cult to sustain funded social security systems.1 In addition to population aging, many countries
have been suﬀering from lower growth and weak fiscal conditions, both of which put pressure
on the finance of pension systems. In these situations, many OECD countries have implemented
reforms of public pension systems in order to improve the financial stability of pension systems.
According to OECD (2015), many countries have increased revenue for financing public pen-
sions by raising payroll tax rates or contributions. In contrast to these countries, in Japan, the
consumption tax (VAT) rate has been increased from 5% into 8% in order to improve the financial
stability of social security systems including public pensions. Therefore, the Japanese pension
system was reformed by introducing VAT financing for the public pension(hereafter VAT-public
pension).
Motivated by these policy eﬀorts to stabilize public pensions, this study investigates the fol-
lowing research questions. First, is a VAT-public pension good or bad for growth? An increase
in VAT would increase revenues for public pensions in the short run; however it might hinder
economic growth and in turn be bad for financing public pensions in the long run. Therefore,
investigating the eﬀect of a VAT-public pension on growth is important. Second, is a VAT-public
pension or a public pension financed by payroll tax (hereafter PT-public pension) better for eco-
nomic growth? In the literature on fiscal policy, many studies investigate the relationship between
tax structures and economic growth (see the survey by Arnold (2008) for example). However, in
the literature on intergenerational public expenditure such as unfunded social security systems,
little attention has been paid to whether payroll tax or VAT is the more growth-friendly tax struc-
ture.2 Therefore, it is important to examine the relationship between the diﬀerences in financing
of public pensions and economic growth.
This study tackles these problems by using endogenous growth models with overlapping-
1OECD (2015) state as follows:?The share of individuals aged 65 and above will increase from 8% of the total
world population in 2015 to almost 18% by 2050 and from 16% to 27% in the OECD. In the OECD, the share of
the population older than 75 years will be similar in 2050 to the share older than 65 years today. Ageing directly
aﬀects the financing of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension schemes, as a decreasing number of working-age people has
to sustain pension levels for an increasing number of elderly.?
2The exception is Naqib and Stolley (1985). They show the following. First, a public pension system reduces
capital accumulation regardless of whether its finance is based on payroll tax or VAT. Second, the reduction in capital
accumulation with a VAT-public pension is less than that with a PT-public pension.
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generations. The models have the following three features. First, human capital accumulation
associated with parental altruism drives economic growth. Second, altruistic parents face a trade-
oﬀ between leaving bequests and investing in their children’s human capital taking account of
these relative returns. Finally, public pension benefits are financed by VAT and payroll tax.
In this study, we consider two kinds of parental altruism. One is the family altruism developed
by Lambrecht et al. (2005) under which agents experience the warm-glow of giving with either
education or bequests to their closest children. The other is a perfect altruism under which agents
care about all future descendants when they decide about educational spending and bequests for
them. This type of family is also known as a dynasty.
Under these frameworks, there are opposite intergenerational transfers in eﬀect, in the sense
that public pension provision is a transfer from children to parents, while educational investment
and bequest from parents aﬀects the disposable income of children. The burden of pension on
the younger generations deters saving and educational spending, which hinders economic growth.
By contrast, public pension benefits increase disposable lifetime income and stimulate transfers
(educational investment and bequests) to children, which enhance economic growth. Hence,
public pensions exert opposite eﬀects on growth through intergenerational transfers.
The diﬀerence in financing the public pension also aﬀects economic growth through the trade-
oﬀ of altruistic transfers between education and bequest. Under the PT-public pension system,
payroll tax lowers returns from educational investment (wage rate) and has negative eﬀects on
growth as indicated in Lambrecht et al. (2005). Conversely, under the VAT-public pension sys-
tem, an increase in VAT substitutes consumption when young into educational spending for chil-
dren, while it substitutes consumption when aged into leaving bequests. The influence of the
VAT-public pension on growth depends on how it aﬀects relative returns between education and
bequests through these substitution eﬀects.
The main results from our study are summarized as follows. First, in a family altruismmodel,
we obtain the following results.
(i) When bequests are operative, a VAT-public pension increases growth unambiguously if
individuals’ utility function takes the log-linear. This is opposite to the case of the PT-
public pension examined by Lambrecht et al. (2005).
(ii) When bequests are inoperative, a VAT-public pension does not always increase growth. It is
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not positive for growth unless individuals are suﬃciently patient. This result is qualitatively
similar to the case of the PT-public pension examined by Lambrecht et al (2005).
(iii) We also check whether a VAT-public pension increases growth when bequests are operative
even under the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) utility functions in a reduced from of endogenous growth model with Romer’s
(1986) AK production technology.
Second, in a perfect altruism model (dynasty model), a VAT-public pension is neutral to growth
while a PT-public pension is bad for growth.
Our results lead to the following implications. First, whether a VAT-public pension is good
for growth depends on the country’s type of altruism. If parents have family altruism and they
are altruistic enough to educate children and leave bequests, introducing a VAT-public pension
may enhance economic growth. By contrast, if parents are not suﬃciently altruistic such that
bequests are inoperative, large burdens of VAT-public pension may be bad for growth. If parents
have perfect altruism, a VAT-public pension is neutral to growth. Second, a VAT-public pension
is more growth-friendly than a PT-public pension when bequests are operative.
The key mechanisms that explain how a VAT-public pension can promote economic growth
and be growth-friendly are as follows. As mentioned above, VAT generates the substitution eﬀect
between educational spending and consumption in youth and between leaving bequests and con-
sumption in old age. When bequests are operative, these two substitution eﬀects oﬀset each other
because of the trade-oﬀ between leaving bequests and educational investment. Therefore VAT
has no distortionary eﬀect on education. This is diﬀerent from the case of a PT-public pension
under which payroll tax lowers returns from educational investment (wage rate) and has a nega-
tive eﬀect on growth as indicated in Lambrecht et al. (2005). In addition to this, VAT does not
distort saving because it becomes neutral to the intertemporal decision of consumption. Thus,
tax can be neutral to both educational spending and saving. Furthermore, VAT-public pension
benefits are partly transferred to children as a bequest, which increases disposable income of
children and promotes saving, educational spending, and economic growth.
Related Literature
To our knowledge, there are some studies on VAT-public pension systems in exogenous growth
models (e.g., Naqib and Stolley 1985; Okamoto 2010, 2013). These studies simulate the policy
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reform into VAT-public pension system. Naqib and Stolley (1985) show that VAT-public pen-
sion has a negative eﬀect on capital accumulation, but the negative eﬀect of VAT-public pension
on capital accumulation is weaker than PT-public pension. Okamoto (2010, 2013) demonstrates
that replacing a PT-public pension with a VAT-public pension stimulates capital accumulation
in Japanese economy. In contrast to these studies, our study shows that the VAT-public pension
system itself may be good for growth analytically.
This study is also related to other studies that address the growth-enhancing eﬀect of public
pension (e.g., Zhang 1995; Sala-i-Martin 1996; Kaganovich and Zilcha 1999; Sanchez-Losada
2000; Lambrecht et al. 2005).3 Sanchez-Losada (2000) and Lambrecht et al. (2005) are closer
to our study. Sanchez-Losada (2000) derives the result that public pensions can increase growth
in an economy of operative bequest. However, he/she does not consider the trade-oﬀ of altruistic
transfer between bequest and education. Lambrecht et al. (2005) incorporate this trade-oﬀ and
find the opposite result to Sanchez-Losada (2000): A public pension is bad for growth when
bequests are operative, while positive eﬀects from pensions on growth occur when bequests are
inoperative. Our study diﬀers from these studies as follows. First, while they focus only on a
PT-public pension, we consider a VAT-public pension. Second, a public pension can be good for
growth under operative bequests in contrast to Lambrecht et al. (2005).
To sum up, this paper is the first study that addresses the growth-enhancing eﬀect of a VAT-
public pension and analytically compares it with a PT-public pension.
2 Model
2.1 individuals
Consider an OLG model in which each individual lives through three periods: childhood, adult-
hood and old age. During adulthood each individual gives birth to 1 + n children. We as-
3Zhang (1995) investigates the issue by exploring a perfect altruism model (dynasty model) with endogenous
fertility and education choices. He shows that an unfunded program may enhance growth by reducing fertility and
increasing human capital investment. Sala-i-Martin (1996) shows that a public pension induces retirement of aged
workers whose obsolete skill exert a negative externality eﬀect on the young workers’ human capital and therefore
promotes economic growth. Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) consider the role of government’s allocation of revenue
between public spending on education and public pension, in which altruistically motivated educational spending
from parents to children exists. They show that if agents are suﬃciently patient and with a large altruism toward
children, a public pension promotes economic growth.
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sume population growth rate n is constant over time. Accordingly, a new cohort consisting of
Nt(= (1 + n)Nt 1) identical individuals is born in each period t. During childhood individuals
do not make any economic decisions but are educated by their parents. When individuals born
at t   1 become adult, they supply ht eﬃciency units of labor (human capital) which depends
on the educational spending by their parents. They receive a market wage (wt) per one unit of
eﬃcient labor supply and a bequest (xt) from their parents. Their disposable current income is
(1 )wtht+xt, where  is the payroll contribution rate to the unfunded public pension scheme.
Each individual spends his/her current disposable income on consumption (ct), private education
((1 + n)et), and savings, (st):
It  (1  )wtht + xt = (1 + c)ct + (1 + n)et + st; (1)
where c is the VAT contribution rate to the unfunded VAT-public pension scheme. (1) indicates
the following assumptions. When both consumption goods and expenditure on private education
services are subject to VAT (i.e., (1+ c)(ct+ (1+ n)et)), each individual can receive a subsidy
on educational spending through their VAT payments ((1 + n)cet).4 This means that, letting
 denote the subsidy rate, we assume that  = c. Alternatively, we can simply assume that
education services are exempt from VAT.5
During old-age, individuals born in t  1 are retired and receive the proceeds of their savings
(Rt+1st), and public pension benefits (t+1). They allocate their total revenue to old-age con-
sumption (dt+1), VAT payment (cdt+1), and a non-negative bequest (xt+1( 0)) to each of their
1 + n children. Thus, the budget constraint when aged is as follows:
(1 + c)dt+1 = Rt+1st + t+1   (1 + n)xt+1: (2)
The human capital of each individual born at t (ht+1) is a function of his/her parents’ private
4This assumption may not be so unrealistic in the future because this is in line with Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe’s plan to use sales tax revenue for education.
5In the EU, education services are exempt from VAT. According to the council of the EU (2006), the EUmember
states shall exempt VAT from the provision of children’s or young people’s education, school or university education,
vocational training or retraining, including the supply of services and of goods closely related thereto, by bodies
governed by public law having such as their aim or by other organizations recognized by theMember State concerned
as having similar objects.
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educational spending (et), and his/her parents’ human capital (ht):
ht+1 = De

th
1 
t ; (3)
where D(> 0) is a scale parameter and  2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of education technology with
respect to private educational spending.
Here, we consider the family altruism developed by Lambrecht et al. (2005) under which
agents have the warm-glow of giving between education and bequests to their closest children.
As in Lambrecht et al. (2005), we assume that individuals who have family altruism derive
utility from the disposable income of their adult children.6 Each individual born at t  1 has the
following logarithmic utility function (hereafter LUF):
Ut = (1  ) ln ct +  ln dt+1 +  ln It+1; (4)
where  2 (0; 1) is the intertemporal preference parameter and (> 0) is the degree of altruism
towards one ?s own children and
It+1 = (1  )wt+1ht+1 + xt+1 = (1  )wt+1Deth1 t + xt+1: (5)
Each individual maximizes utility (4) under constraints (1), (2), and (5) and the non-negativity
of bequests xt+1  0 by choosing ct, et, st, dt+1, and xt+1. The first order conditions (FOCs) are
@Ut
@st
=  1  
ct
+
Rt+1
dt+1
= 0; (6)
@Ut
@et
=  (1  )(1 + n)
(1 + c)ct
+
(1  )wt+1De 1t h1 t
It+1
= 0; (7)
@Ut
@xt+1
=   (1 + n)
(1 + c)dt+1
+

It+1
 0 (= 0 if xt+1 > 0): (8)
First, (6) indicates that VAT is neutral to the intertemporal decision of saving. Second, (7) shows
that VAT reduces the marginal cost of educational spending and boosts investment in education:
the substitution eﬀect of c on et. By contrast, payroll tax ( ) decreases the marginal benefit of
6This assumption is common to some studies that investigate intergenerational transfers or fiscal policies in a
family altruism model (e.g., Lambrecht et al. 2005; Lambrecht et al. 2006; Kunze 2010, 2012, 2014; Alonso-
Carrera et al. 2012).
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educational spending and retards investment in education: the negative distortionary eﬀect of 
on et. Finally, (8) indicates that VAT increases the incentive to leave bequests because c reduces
the marginal cost of leaving bequests: the substitution eﬀect of c on xt+1.
Substituting (6) and (7) into (8) yields
(1  )wt+1De 1t h1 t  Rt+1: (9)
The left hand side (LHS) of (9) represents the rate of return on educational spending whereas the
right hand side (RHS) represents the rate of interest (the rate of return on saving for bequeathing).
When bequests are operative, (9) holds with equality. In contrast, when bequests are inoperative,
the rate of return on educational spending is strictly higher than the rate of interest.
2.2 Firms
In every period t, firms produce a single output under perfect competition by using physical
capital (Kt), and human capital (Ht). The production function is assumed to take the Cobb-
Douglas form:
Yt = AK

t H
1 
t ; (10)
whereA(> 0) is the scale parameter and 2 (0; 1) denotes the capital share. Profitmaximization
yields the following marginal productivity conditions:
wt = (1  ) Yt
Ht
= (1  )Akt ; (11)
Rt = 
Yt
Kt
= Ak 1t ; (12)
where, kt = Kt=Ht is the physical to human capital ratio.
2.3 public pension system
The unfunded public pension system works as follows. The government in period t collects
contributions from the wage income of the adults (wthtNt 1), and from consumption both by
adults and the aged (c(ctNt 1+dtNt 2)), and transfers its total revenue (wthtNt 1+c(ctNt 1+
dtNt 2)), to the aged in period t as a pension benefit (tNt 2). Thus, the government constraint
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in each period t is given by
(1 + n)wtht + (1 + n)cct + cdt = t: (13)
2.4 Intertemporal Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the capital market clearing condition in any period t  0 becomes
Kt = st 1Nt 2: (14)
With the initial stock of physical capital (K0), given,K0 belongs to the N 2 individuals who are
aged in period 0. That is each of the initial aged owns s 1 = K0=N 2. Furthermore, the market
clearing conditions for the labor and goods market are:
Ht = htNt 1; (15)
Yt = [ct + (1 + n)et]Nt 1 + dtNt 2 +Kt+1: (16)
Here, let us define ct+ dt=(1+ n)  't for tractability. By using 't, equations (13) and (16) are
rewritten as
c't + wtht =
t
1 + n
; (17)
Yt = 'tNt 1 + (1 + n)etNt 1 +Kt+1: (18)
3 Dynamics
3.1 Operative bequests
When bequests are operative, (9) holds with equality: (1  )wt+1De 1t h1 t = Rt+1. Substi-
tuting (11), (12), and (15) into this condition gives
(1 + n)etNt 1 =
(1  )(1  )

Kt+1: (19)
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Because of the trade-oﬀ between educational spending and bequest motives, the substitution
eﬀect of c on et (see (7)) and that on xt+1 (see (8)) oﬀset each other. Therefore, educational
spending (et) is independent of the burden from VAT (c). By contrast, payroll tax ( ) has a
negative distortionary eﬀect on et as seen from (7).
Using (2) and (8) with equality leads to (1+ c)dt+1 = [(1+n)=]It+1. Substituting it into
(2), we obtain:
It+1 =

(1 + n)
[Rt+1st + t+1   (1 + n)xt+1]: (20)
Combining (5) with (20) and using (17) yield:
xt+1 =

 + 

Rt+1st
1 + n
+ c't+1

+

   
 + 

wt+1ht+1: (21)
(21) indicates the following. First, bequest motive (xt+1) is independent of the burden from
VAT(c).This is because the positive substitution eﬀect of c on xt+1 (see (8)) and the negative
income eﬀect of c on xt+1 (see (1)) oﬀset each other. 7 Second, public pension benefits (c't+1
and wt+1ht+1) increase bequests (xt+1) because they increase consumption in old age (dt+1) and
have positive income eﬀects on bequests.
Next, from (14) and (19), educational spending is proportional to saving: et =  1(1  
)(1  )st. Substituting it into (1) and using (2), (6), and (17), we obtain
1 +
(1  )(1  )


st =[(1  )wtht + xt]
+ (1  )(1 + n)

xt+1
Rt+1
  c't+1 + wt+1ht+1
Rt+1

: (22)
(22) indicates the following. First, saving (st) is independent of the burden from VAT (c) as
we have seen in (6). On the contrary, a payroll tax ( ) has a negative distortionary eﬀect on
saving (st). Second, the bequest income from parents (xt) and altruistic bequests to children
7This is attributed to the LUF under which the income and substitution eﬀects oﬀset each other. Therefore, if we
apply more general preferences such as the CRRA and CES utility functions, xt+1 can depend on c. However, this
generalization complicates the analyses and makes it diﬃcult to derive policy implications. Here, applying the LUF
is somewhat more useful for the analytical investigations. In addition, the LUF is supported by some theoretical and
empirical studies. In the literature of business cycle models, Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Jones et al. (2000)
argue that the LUF leads the solutions from the model to fit the real data very well. Dalgaard and Jensen (2007)
also justify the LUF, observing that the empirical saving elasticity is more or less constant. Furthermore, Guvenen
(2006) shows that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 1 (the case of LUF) can be precisely estimated if the
non-constant variance term is included in a regression of the log-linearized version of the Euler equation.
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(xt+1) positively aﬀect st. Finally, public pension benefits have a negative eﬀect on st in line
with Feldstein (1974), which is attributed to the fact that public pension benefits lead to less
incentive to save.
From (18) and (19), we obtain:
Kt+1 =
(1 t)
 + (1  )(1  )Yt; (23)
where we define the ratio of consumption to output as t  ('tNt 1)=Yt(< 1). Substituting
(21) into (22) and using (11), (12), (14), (15), (23), and the definition of t, we obtain:
1   + [+ (1  )(1  )]
1 + c
+
(1  )c
1 + c
t+1 = [ + (1  )(1  )] t
1 t : (24)
Please see Appendix A for the derivation of (24). Here, let us define the LHS and RHS of (24) as
 (t+1) and 	(t), respectively. By substituting the definition of t into (21), we can rewrite
the non-negative bequest condition, xt+1  0 as follows.8
 +
ct
(1  )( + )  1 

(1  )( + )  : (25)
(25) is satisfied for any t 2 (0; 1) if      0. Examining (25) and (24), we arrive at the
following:
[Figure 1]
Lemma 1  (t+1) and	(t) intersect at a unique pointE in whicht has a unique equilibrium
value  2 (0; 1) if     0, as shown in Figure 1.  is given by:
1   + [ + (1  )(1  )]
1 + c
+
(1  )c
1 + c
 = [ + (1  )(1  )] 

1  : (26)
t jumps to its equilibrium value, , initially.
Proof: See Appendix B.
8By adding wt+1ht+1 to both sides of (21), we can rewrite it into
xt+1 =

 + 

Rt+1st
1 + n
+ wt+1ht+1 + c't+1

  (1  )wt+1ht+1:
Substituting it into xt+1  0 leads to (25).
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We next move onto characterizing the intertemporal equilibrium path and the long-run growth
rate of the economy with operative bequests, when the value of is given by (26). Substituting
(23) into (19) and using (10), (15), and kt = Kt=Ht, we obtain:
et =
(1  )(1  )(1 )
(1 + n)[ + (1  )(1  )]Ak

t ht: (27)
From (3) and (27), the accumulation of each individual’s human capital is:
ht+1
ht
= D

(1  )(1  )(1 )A
(1 + n)[ + (1  )(1  )]

kt : (28)
We rewrite (23) by using (10) and kt = Kt=Ht into kt+1Ht+1Ht =
(1 )
+(1 )(1 )Ak

t . Substituting
Ht+1=Ht = (1 + n)(ht+1=ht) and (28) into it, we obtain
kt+1 =

D(1  )(1  )

(1  )(1  )(1 )A
(1 + n)[ + (1  )(1  )]
1 
k
(1 )
t : (29)
These dynamics of kt show that a unique intertemporal equilibriumwith operative bequests exists
in each period, for      0, given initial values for physical, K0 > 0, and human capital,
H0 = h0N 1 > 0. This is in line with Lambrecht et al. (2005) because we can confirm that
when c = 0, (29) is consistent with the dynamics of kt in Lambrecht et al. (2005).
From (28) and (29), the physical to human capital ratio in the steady state k and the long-run
growth in individual’s human capital are:
k =


D(1  )(1  )
 1
1 (1 )

(1  )(1  )(1 )A
(1 + n)[ + (1  )(1  )]
 1 
1 (1 )
; (30)
ht+1
ht
= D

(1  )(1  )(1 )A
(1 + n)[ + (1  )(1  )]

(k); (31)
and Yt, Kt, and Ht grow at the same rate of Ht+1=Ht = (1 + n)(ht+1=ht) in the steady state.
Policy eﬀect of an increase in c
Consider now the eﬀect of an increase in c on and economic growth. An increase in c leads
to a downward shift in  (t+1) because d (t+1)dc =
1 
(1+c)2
n
t+1   1  [+(1 )(1 )]1 
o
< 0
holds from t+1 < 1. The new equilibrium is shown in point E 0 in Figure 1. Accordingly, we
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find that an increase in c reduces the ratio of consumption to output from to. Because the
individual’s human capital in the long run (ht+1=ht) is decreasing in  from (31), an increase
in c encourages the accumulation of individual’s human capital and fosters economic growth.
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1
When bequests are operative, an increase (introduction) of an unfunded VAT-public pension de-
creases the ratio of consumption to output () and enhances economic growth.
This is opposite to the result in the case of a PT-public pension system shown by Lambrecht et al
(2005). They show that a PT-public pension system ( ) unambiguously reduces economic growth
when bequests are operative.
Here, we consider the intuition behind the result from Proposition 1 and the diﬀerence be-
tween a VAT-public pension and PT-public pension. As we have seen in (19) and (22), both
saving (st) and educational spending (et) are independent of the burden from VAT (c).
However, c aﬀects both st and et through VAT-public pension benefits. Some opposite ef-
fects of a VAT-public pension on st exist. First, the positive income eﬀect of public pension on
bequests to children (xt+1) increases st (see (22) and (22)). Second, VAT-public pension coun-
ters st because it reduces incentive to save (see (22)). These are also the case with et because
et is proportional to st(= Kt+1=Nt 1) (see (19)). Finally, the positive income eﬀect of a public
pension on bequests (xt) increases disposable income when young (It) and increases both st and
et. These positive eﬀects of a VAT-public pension on both et and st dominate the negative eﬀect,
which encourages physical and human capital accumulation and fosters economic growth.
In contrast to the case of a VAT-public pension, a PT-public pension reduces economic growth
because the direct negative distortionary eﬀect of  on et has a detrimental eﬀect on growth (see
(19)).
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3.2 Inoperative bequests
When bequests are not operative (  > 0 and xt+1 = 0), (5) becomes It+1 = (1 )wt+1ht+1.
Substituting It+1 = (1  )wt+1ht+1 into (7), we obtain
et =
(1 + c)ct
(1  )(1 + n) : (32)
Furthermore, applying inoperative bequests, xt = xt+1 = 0, into both (1) and (2), we obtain
the budget constraint in adulthood, (1   )wtht = (1 + c)ct + (1 + n)et + st, and that in old
age, (1 + c)dt+1 = Rt+1st + t+1, respectively. From these two budget constraints (6) and (32),
saving (st), and educational spending (et) of each adult are obtained as follows:
st =
(1  )
1 + 
wtht   1   + 
1 + 
t+1
Rt+1
; (33)
et =

(1 + )(1 + n)

(1  )wtht + t+1
Rt+1

: (34)
Substituting (11), (12), (14), (15), and (17) into (33) and using t  ('tNt 1)=Yt, we obtain:
Kt+1 =
(1  )(1  )
 + (1   + )[ + (1  ) + ct+1]Yt (35)
Substituting (34) into (18) and using (11), (12), (14), (17), (33), and (35), we obtain
(1  )(1  )[ + f + (1  ) + ct+1g]
 + (1   + )f + (1  ) + ct+1g = 1 t: (36)
Please see Appendix C for the derivation of this equation. Here, let us define the LHS and RHS
of (36) as ~ (t+1) and ~	(t), respectively. Examining (36), we arrive at the following:
[Figure 2]
Lemma 2 ~ (t+1) and ~	(t) intersect at a unique point E in which t has a unique steady
state value  as shown in Figure 2.  is given by:
(1  )(1  )[ + f + (1  ) + cg]
 + (1   + )f + (1  ) + cg = 1 
: (37)
t jumps to its equilibrium value, , initially.
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Proof: See Appendix D
We next move to characterize the intertemporal equilibrium path and the long-run growth rate
of the economy with inoperative bequests, when the value of  is given by (37). Substituting
(17) into (34) and using (10), (11), (12), (15), (35), 1 + n = Nt=Nt 1, kt = Kt=Ht, and the
definition of t, we obtain
et =
[ + c
 + (1  )](1  )(1  )
(1 + n)f + [ + c + (1  )](1   + )gAk

t ht: (38)
See Appendix E for the derivation of (38) in detail. From (3) and (38), the accumulation of each
individual’s human capital is
ht+1
ht
= D

[+ c
 + (1  )](1  )(1  )A
(1 + n)f + [+ c + (1  )](1   + )g

kt : (39)
Now rewrite (35) in equilibrium by using (10) and kt = Kt=Ht into
kt+1
Ht+1
Ht
=
(1  )(1  )
 + [ + c + (1  )](1   + )Ak

t :
Substituting Ht+1=Ht = (1 + n)(ht+1=ht) and (39) into it, we obtain:
kt+1 =
D 1z()1 
f[+ c + (1  )]g k
(1 )
t ; (40)
z()  (1  )(1  )A
(1 + n)f + [+ c + (1  )](1   + )g :
These dynamics of kt converge monotonically towards a steady state.9 From (39) and (40), the
physical to human capital ratio in the steady state k and the long-run growth in individual’s
human capital are
k =

D 1() [ + c + (1  )] z()1 
	 1
1 (1 ) ; (41)
ht+1
ht
= D f[ + c + (1  )]z()g (k): (42)
9Here, we can confirm that when c = 0, (40) is consistent with the dynamics of kt in Lambrecht et al (2005),
when we use + (1  ) = 1  (1  )(1  ).
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In this steady state with inoperative bequests, Yt, Kt, and Ht grow at the same constant rate:
Ht+1=Ht = (1 + n)(ht+1=ht).
Policy eﬀect of an increase in c
The rest of this subsection examines the eﬀects of a public pension system financed by c. An
increase in c leads to a downward shift in ~ (t+1) because of
sign
d~ (t+1)
dc
=   (1  )t+1f + (1   + )[ + (1  ) + ct+1]g2 < 0
Thus, an increase in c raises the long–run ratio of consumption to output from  to . It is
noticeable that this result is opposite to the case when the bequests are operative.
In contrast to the case of operative bequests, the introduction of a VAT-public pension system
does not always enhance economic growth. More specifically, if  > (<)   (1+)[1 (1 )(1 )]
1+(1 ) ,
the introduction of a small VAT-public pension is good (bad) for growth. When  > , the
growth-maximizing size of a VAT-public pension (GMc ) exists from some numerical examples.10
These results are qualitatively similar to those in Lambrecht et al. (2005) who examine public
pensions financed both by a lump sum tax and payroll tax.
These results are a result of the following reasons. There are two opposite eﬀects of public
pension benefits on growth because public pension benefits lead to less incentive to save (see
(33)), but have a positive income eﬀect on education (see (34)). In contrast to the case of operative
bequests, the young do not benefit from bequests from their parents, and then disposable income
for both saving and educational spending becomes smaller. Therefore, the growth-enhancing
eﬀects are weaker than in the case of operative bequests, and thus a VAT-public pension does not
always foster economic growth.
4 Case studies under more general utility functions
Thus far, we have assumed the LUF because this is beneficial to analyzing the social security
policies in the standard OLG model with complementarity between physical and human capital.
However, the LUF oﬀsets the income and substitution eﬀects through VAT. Then, the objective
10When (; ; ; ; ) = (0:25; 0:4; 0:2; 0:6; 0:1), we obtain the growth-maximizing size of a VAT-public pension
system GMc of 0.12.
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in this section is to take these two eﬀects into account. To do so, we introduce the CRRA and
CES utility functions and focus on the case of operative bequests in which policy implication
is largely diﬀerent from Lambrecht et al. (2005). In this experiment, we simplify the model by
ignoring human capital and using the AK model as in Romer (1986). This is because, in the case
of operative bequests, investment in human capital (et) is proportional to that in physical capital
(st) and these two play similar role in growth.11
Here, we specify the production function of firm j as Yj;t = AKj;t (atLj;t)
1  (0 <  < 1),
where at = Kt=Lt, Kj;t, Lj;t, Kt, and Lt represent labor productivity, physical capital of firm
j, labor input of firm j, the aggregate stock of private capital, and the aggregate labor input,
respectively. This specification follows Romer (1986). We assume that the population size is
normalized to 1 without loss of generality. In the equilibrium, Kj;t = Kt and Lj;t = Lt = 1
hold for all j, and thus the factor prices and aggregate output in period t can be written as wt =
A(1  )Kt, R = A;, and Yt = AKt, respectively.
Without educational spending, the budget constraints of each individual are (1 )wt+xt =
(1 + c)ct + st and (1 + c)dt+1 = Rt+1st + t+1   xt+1, where we assume that the population
growth rate (n) is zero for simplicity.
4.1 A time-additive CRRA preference
Here, we consider the case of time–additive CRRA preference. Then, let us change (4) into
Ut = (1  )c
1 1=
t   1
1  1= + 
d
1 1=
t+1   1
1  1= + 
I
1 1=
t+1   1
1  1= ; (43)
where  represents the elasticity of substitution between ct and dt+1 and It+1.12 The case of (4)
(i.e., the LUF) realizes when  = 1. The FOCs for the households with respect to st and xt+1
are as follows:
dt+1 = (R)
ct; (44)
It+1 = (1 + c)
(=)dt+1: (45)
11Remember that when bequests are operative, et is determined by the relative returns of physical and human
capital (see (9) and (19)).
12This specification is in line with Kunze (2010) who investigates the eﬀects of increasing capital income tax on
economic growth.
17
where   =(1 ). Because we restrict our attention to the case of operative bequest, equation
(45) holds with equality.
From (44), (45), aggregate output: Yt = AKt, factor prices: wt = A(1 )Kt and R = A,
the households’ budget constraints: (1   )wt + xt = (1 + c)ct + st and (1 + c)dt+1 =
Rt+1st+t+1 xt+1, the asset market clearing condition: Kt+1 = st, and the resource constraint
of the economy: Yt = ct + dt +Kt+1, we obtain:
A(1 + ct+1)
1 + c
+
(R)
1 + c
= (R)(=)(1 + c)
 1 t
1 t ; (46)
where t  (ct + dt)=Yt.13 (46) indicates the following. First, the steady–state value, ,
is uniquely determined as represented by Figure 3. Second, as we have expected (see the first
paragraph of this section), the properties of (46) are qualitatively similar to those of (24). Finally,
in the case of a VAT-public pension, how an increase in c aﬀects depends largely on the value
of . The relationship between  and the eﬀect of an increase in c on  is summarized in the
following Lemma 3.
[Figure 3]
Lemma 3 Under the CRRA utility function, AK production technology, and operative bequest,
the following results hold. (I) An increase in c shifts the LHS of (46) downward. (II) The eﬀects
of increasing c on the RHS of (46) are classified into the following two cases.
1. If   1, an increase in c shifts the RHS of (46) leftward, and therefore  decreases as
represented in Figure 3.
2. If 0 <  < 1, an increase in c shifts the RHS of (46) rightward, and therefore, whether
 decreases or increases is ambiguous. However, if  is small enough to be close to 0,
an increase in c raises  as represented in Figure 3.
Next, we rewrite the resource constraint: Kt+1 = Yt (ct+dt) intoKt+1=Kt = A(1 t) by
using (ct+ dt)=Yt  t and Yt = AKt. Combining Lemma 3 with it, we arrive at the following
proposition:
13Without investment on human capital, payroll tax ( ) does not aﬀect, and then Ricardian equivalence holds
with respect to a PT-public pension in line with Lambrecht et al. (2006).
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Proposition 2
1. If   1, an increase in c enhances economic growth.
2. If 0 <  < 1, the eﬀect of an increase in c on economic growth is ambiguous . However,
if  is small enough to be close to 0, an increase in c hinders economic growth.
From (44) and (45), we obtain
It+1 = (R)
(=)(1 + c)
ct:
A large  means that individuals save more for bequeathing, and then the substitution eﬀect
between ct and It+1 becomes large. A higher VAT (c) leads to a higher (lower) price of con-
sumption (bequeathing) and increases bequests. This positive substitution eﬀect of c on bequests
is represented as (1+c). By contrast, there is a negative income eﬀect of c on bequests, which
is represented as (1 + c) 1. From (46), we can confirm that without the case of LUF ( 6= 1),
both the substitution and income eﬀects do not oﬀset each other, and therefore c is not neutral
to bequests.
When   1, the positive substitution eﬀect dominates the negative income eﬀect, and then
VAT increases bequest motives and savings. This stimulus adds to the positive income eﬀect
of a VAT-public pension on bequests as we have seen in subsection 3.1. Thus, increases in a
VAT-public pension promote capital accumulation and economic growth.
In contrast, when  < 1, the income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect, and then VAT
decreases bequest motives and savings. In this case, whether a VAT-public pension system is
good for growth is ambiguous and depends on the relative magnitude of the negative burden
eﬀect of VAT and the positive income eﬀect of the public pension on bequests. When  ! 0, the
former is stronger than the latter. Thus, increases in VAT-public pension retard economic growth.
4.2 A CES preference
Next, we consider the following CES utility function:
Ut =

1c

t + 2d

t+1 + 3I

t+1
 1
 ;   1; (47)
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where 1, 2, and 3 are positive constants that satisfy 1 + 2 + 3 = 1, and 1=(1   ) is the
elasticity of substitution between ct and dt+1 and It+1. The FOCs for the households with respect
to st and xt+1 are dt+1 =

2
1
 1
1 
R
1
1  ct and It+1 =

3
2
 1
1 
(1 + c)
1
1  dt+1, respectively. As
in the procedure to derive (46), we obtain
A(1 + ct+1)
1 + c
+

2
1
 1
1  R
1
1 
1 + c
=

3
1
 1
1 
R
1
1  (1 + c)

1 
t
1 t : (48)
We find that the properties of (48) are qualitatively similar to those of (46). (48) indicates that
when 0 <   1, the positive substitution eﬀect of an increase in c dominates the negative
income eﬀect, and then VAT increases bequest motives and savings, which fosters economic
growth.
5 Growth eﬀect of VAT-public pension system under a perfect
altruism model with operative bequests
In this section, we examine the growth eﬀect of a VAT-public pension system under a perfect
altruism model with operative bequests (Barro’s (1974) type model). In contrast to family altru-
ism, a perfect altruism assumes that parents take all future generations’ utility into account. That
is the representative agent maximizes the following utility
V0 =
1X
t=0
t[(1  ) ln ct +  ln dt+1]; (49)
subject to the budget constraints (1): (1   )wtht + xt = (1 + c)ct + (1 + n)et + st and (2):
(1 + c)dt+1 = Rt+1st + t+1  (1 + n)xt+1, human capital accumulation (3): ht+1 = Deth1 t ,
and nonnegative bequest constraint (xt+1 > 0), taking  and c as given. FOCs are given by
st : dt+1 =

1  Rt+1ct; (50)
et :
1 + n
ct
= 
1  
ct+1
wt+1ht+1
et
; (51)
xt+1 : ct+1 =
Rt+1
1 + n
ct: (52)
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Definition. Given an initial state (N 2; K0; H0), a competitive equilibrium in the economy with
public pensions is a sequence of allocations fct; dt; Nt 1; xt; et; st; t; Kt+1; Ht+1; Ytg1t=0 and
prices fRt; wtg1t=0 such that (i) taking prices and the tax and replacement rates (; c) as given,
firms and households optimize their solutions ((11), (12), (50), (51), and (52)) are feasible, (ii)
the budget for public pensions is balanced: (13), and (iii) markets clear with (14) and (15).
From these equilibrium conditions, Appendix F derives
(1 + n)etNt 1 =
(1  )(1  )

Kt+1; (53)
Kt+1 = stNt 1 = Yt; (54)
and the aggregate growth rate in the steady state as
Yt+1
Yt
= D(1 + n)

(1  )A
1 + n



1 (1 ) (1  ) (1 )1 (1 ) : (55)
From (55), we immediately obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3
a VAT-Public pension (c) is neutral to economic growth whereas a PT-public pension ( ) is bad
for economic growth.
Proposition 3 indicates that, in contrast to the case of family altruism, VAT-public pension
(c) is neutral to economic growth in that of perfect altruism, while the eﬀect of a PT-public
pension ( ) on economic growth is common to both cases.
This is as a result of the following reasons. First of all, (53) is attributed to the trade-oﬀ
between educational spending and bequest motives and is the same as (19). Thus, like the family
altruism model,  has a negative distortionary eﬀect on et whereas c is neutral to et (see below
(19)).
Furthermore, (54) indicates that public pensions are neutral to the saving ratio in line with
the Ricardian hypothesis. Combining (54) with (53), we find that a VAT-public pension (c) has
no impact on both physical and human capital accumulation, and therefore it is neutral to growth.
On the other hand, a PT-public pension ( ) has no impact on physical capital accumulation, but
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the negative distortionary eﬀect in (53) remains, which hinders growth.
6 Conclusion
This study investigated (i) how a VAT-public pension aﬀects economic growth, and (ii) whether
payroll tax or VAT is a more growth-friendly tax structure for the finance of public pensions. We
tackled these problems by endogenous growth models in which altruistic parents face a trade-oﬀ
between leaving a bequest and investing in their children’s human capital taking account of these
relative returns. In the case of family altruism, we obtained the following results.
A VAT-public pension system itself can increase economic growth when bequests are oper-
ative. This result is opposite to the case of PT-public pension as in Lambrecht et al. (2005). By
contrast, when bequests are inoperative, VAT-public pension does not enhance economic growth
unless agents are suﬃciently patient. This result is qualitatively similar to a PT-public pension.
In the case of the perfect altruism model, a VAT-public pension is neutral to growth while a
PT-public pension is bad for growth.
Our results lead to the following implications. First, whether a VAT-public pension is good
for growth depends on its country’s type of altruism. If parents have family altruism and they
are altruistic enough to educate children and leave bequests, introducing a VAT-public pension
may enhance economic growth. By contrast, if parents are not suﬃciently altruistic such that
bequests are inoperative, the large burdens of a VAT-public pension may be bad for growth. If
parents have perfect altruism, a VAT-public pension is neutral to growth. Second, a VAT-public
pension is more growth-friendly than a PT-public pension when bequests are operative.
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Appendix
A Derivation of (24)
Substituting (21) into (22) gives

1 +
(1  )(1  )


st =

 + 

wtht +
Rtst 1
1 + n
+ c't

+
1  
 + 

st   (1 + n)c't+1 + wt+1ht+1
Rt+1

: (A.1)
wt = (1 )Yt=Ht ((11)),Ht = htNt 1 ((15)), Rt = Yt=Kt ((12)),Kt = st 1Nt 2 ((14)), and
Nt 1 = (1 + n)Nt 2 rewrite (A.1) into
1 +
(1  )(1  )


Kt+1
Nt 1
=

 + 

Yt
Nt 1
+ c't

+
1  
 + 

   (1  )


Kt+1
Nt 1
  

c(1 + n)'t+1Kt+1
Yt+1

;
,

f+ (1  )(1  )g( + )  (1  )f( + )  g+ (1  )c't+1Nt
Yt+1

Kt+1
= 

1 +
c'tNt 1
Yt

Yt: (A.2)
Substituting (23) into (A.2) and using t  'tNt 1=Yt yield
[1   + f + (1  )(1  )g( + ) + (1  )ct+1] (1 t)
+ (1  )(1  ) = (1 + ct);
,1   + [ + (1  )(1  )]
1 + c
+
(1  )c
1 + c
t+1 = [ + (1  )(1  )] t
1 t :
B Proof of Lemma 1
The properties of  (t+1) and	(t) as follows. On the one hand,  (t+1) is an upward-sloping
line because of  0(t+1) = (1 )c1+c > 0, and  
00(t+1) = 0, and it intersects the vertical axis
at the positive value of  (0) = 1 +[+(1 )(1 )]
1+c
> 0. On the other hand, 	(t) is a strictly
increasing and convex function oft because of	0() = [+(1 )(1 )] 2 t(1 t)2 > 0 and
	00() = [ + (1  )(1  )] 3 t
(1 t)3 > 0. In addition, 	(t) equals to zero when t = 0.
Thus, a unique equilibrium E that is unstable exists as represented by Figure 1. This implies
that the forward-looking variablemust jump to at the initial date. Otherwise, the monotonic
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dynamics would leadst to either 0 or 1. Neithert = 0 nort = 1 are valid equilibria because
of the following reasons. First,t = 0 leads to ct = dt = 0 and violates the first order condition
under the LUF of ln ct and ln dt+1.14 Second, t = 1 leads to Kt+1 = 0 from (23) and again to
the unrational choice ct+1 = dt+1 = 0.
C Derivation of (36)
From (33), we obtain (1  )wtht = 1+ st + (1 +)t+1Rt+1 . Substituting it into (34), we obtain
(1 + n)et =



st +
t+1
Rt+1

: (C.1)
Substituting (C.1) into (18) yields Yt   'tNt 1 = 

stNt 1 +
t+1
Rt+1

+ Kt+1. By using (14)
and (17), it is rewritten as
Yt   'tNt 1 =  + 

Kt+1 +


 c't+1Nt + wt+1Ht+1
Rt+1
: (C.2)
Substituting (11) and (12) into (C.2), and using the definition of t, we obtain
1 t = f + [+ (1  ) + ct+1]g

 Kt+1
Yt
: (C.3)
Substituting (35) into (C.3) yields
(1  )(1  )[ + f + (1  ) + ct+1g]
 + (1   + )f + (1  ) + ct+1g = 1 t: (C.4)
D Proof of Lemma 2
It is obvious that ~ (t+1) 2 (0; 1) holds for any t+1 2 (0; 1) because of (1   )(1   ) < 1
and 1    > 0. Furthermore, sign~ 0(t+1) =   (1 )cf+[+(1 )+ct+1]gf+(1 +)[+(1 )+ct+1]g2 < 0 holds,
and therefore ~ (t+1) is monotonically decreasing in t+1. By contrast, ~	(t) is a line with a
negative slope and takes the values, ~	(0) = 1 and ~	(1) = 0. From these properties of ~ (t+1)
and ~	(t), a unique unstable equilibrium E exists as shown in Figure 2. This implies that the
forward-looking variable  must jump to  at the initial date.
14The LUF, u(y) = ln y, is a typical function that satisfies the Inada condition: limy!0 u0(y) = +1.
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E Derivation of (38)
Substituting (17) into (34) and using (11), (12), we obtain
et =

(1 + )(1 + n)
"
(1  )(1  ) Yt
Ht
ht +
(1 + n)[c't+1 + (1  ) Yt+1Ht+1ht+1]
 Yt+1
Kt+1
#
(E.1)
By using (15), 1 + n = Nt=Nt 1 and the definition of t( 'tNt 1=Yt), (E.1) is rearranged as
et =

(1 + )(1 + n)Nt 1

(1  )(1  )Yt + [c
 + (1  )]Kt+1


: (E.2)
By substituting (35) into (E.2) and using (10), (15) and kt = Kt=Ht, we obtain (38).
F Perfect altruism model with operative bequests
Substituting (52) into (51) and using (11), (12), and (15), we find that et is given by the same
equation as (19): (1 + n)etNt 1 = (1 )(1 ) Kt+1. In addtion, (23): Kt+1 =
(1 t)
+(1 )(1 )Yt is
obtained in the same procedures as in Section 3.
From (50) and (52), we obtain dt=(1 + n) = (1 ) ct. Adding ct to both sides of this equa-
tion and using the definition of 't yields ct + dt=(1 + n) =
h

(1 ) + 1
i
ct , 'tNt 1 =
+(1 )
(1 ) ctNt 1. Dividing both side of this equation by Yt, we obtain
ctNt 1
Yt
=
(1  )
(1  ) + t: (F.1)
Substituting (12) into (52) leads to (1+n)ct+1Nt 1 =  Yt+1Kt+1 ctNt 1 ,
ct+1Nt
Yt+1
=  ctNt 1
Yt
Yt
Kt+1
.
Combining this with (23) and (F.1) yields
t+1 = [ + (1  )(1  )] t
1 t : (F.2)
The LHS of (F.2) is an upward-sloping 45 line and takes zero when t = 0. On the other
hand, the RHS of (F.2) is a monotonically increasing and convex function of t and takes zero
when t = 0. These properties of (F.2) indicate the following. First t has a unique steady
value = 1  [+ (1  )(1  )]. Second, this unique equilibrium is unstable so that the
forward-looking variable  must jump to  at the initial date.
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Inserting t =  = 1   [ + (1   )(1   )] into (23), we obtain Kt+1 = Yt. This
together with (14): Kt+1 = stNt 1 yields stNt 1=Yt = . Substituting it into (1+n)etNt 1 =
(1 )(1 )

Kt+1 yields (1 + n)etNt 1 = (1   )(1   )Yt, and using (10), kt = Kt=Ht, and
(15), we obtain
et =
(1  )(1  )
1 + n
Akt ht: (F.3)
From (3) and (F.3), we obtain
ht+1
ht
= D

(1  )(1  )A
1 + n

kt : (F.4)
By using (10) and kt = Kt=Ht, Kt+1 = Yt is rewritten into kt+1Ht+1 = Akt Ht. Using it
together with Ht+1=Ht = (1 + n)ht+1=ht and (F.4), we obtain
kt+1 =
A
(1 + n)D

1 + n
(1  )(1  )A

k
(1 )
t : (F.5)
These dynamics of kt converge monotonically towards a steady state value: k = 
1
1 (1 ) (1 
)
 
1 (1 ) , where   A
(1+n)D
h
1+n
(1 )A
i
. Inserting this steady state value (k) into (F.4) yields
the accumulation of human capital per capita in the steady state as
ht+1
ht
= D

(1  )A
1 + n



1 (1 ) (1  ) (1 )1 (1 ) : (F.6)
In the steady state, Yt,Kt, andHt grow at the same constant rate: Ht+1=Ht = (1+n)(ht+1=ht) =
D(1 + n)
n
(1 )A
1+n
o


1 (1 ) (1  ) (1 )1 (1 ) .
28
0E
¢
t
¡(¢
t+1
) 
¢*
E′    
¢**
¿c"
ª(¢
t    
)
downward
shift
1
¡(¢
t+1
) 
Figure 1:  when bequest is operative.
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Figure 2:  when bequest is inoperative.
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Figure 3:  when bequest is operative in an AK model with CRRA utility function.
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